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CASE COMMENTS
cedural right to file charges with the Board which is unaffected
by the proviso to section 8 (b) (1) (A). Even assuming that the
right to file charges with the Board is an "exercise" of a section
7 right and thus subject to the restrictions of the proviso, an
examination of the rationale of the proviso as it relates to sec-
tion 7 reveals that Congress intended to provide immediate ac-
cess to the Board for union members who allege section 7 viola-
tions. That section simultaneously grants to members the
right to participate in various organizational and bargaining
activities and preserves the right to refrain from such partic-
pation. However, individual members must necessarily waive
some of these rights if the union is to perform its proper function
as an economic bargaining unit.2 7 To this end the proviso per-
mits unions to employ peaceful disciplinary techniques to fur-
ther the achievement of goals established by the majority of the
union. However, in the instant case, there is no legitimate group
interest in restricting the union member's access to the Board.
The interests of the union member would be best imple-
mented by the Detroy interpretation of section 101 (a) (4) and an
interpretation of section 8 (b) (1) (A) which provides an immedi-
ate right of access to the Board for members claiming section 7
violations. If the Detroy interpretation of section 101 (a) (4)
were adopted, additional protection of the union member under
section 8(b) (1) (A) would not be absolutely necessary. How-
ever, the remedy offered by section 101 (a) (4) has been criticized
as illusory because of the expense of filing an individual suit in
federal court,28 whereas the N.L.R.B. assumes the expense of a
section 8 (b) (1) (A) suit, thus offering a more realistic means of
redress.
Taxation: Current Status of Professional Corporations
Plaintiff, an employee-stockholder of an incorporated Colo-
rado law firm,' sought a refund on personal income taxes paid
27. NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967); Local
283, UAW, 145 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1964).
28. In all Title I proceedings, the plaintiff must retain his own
attorney, and these expenditures are not recoverable. See Klein, UAW
Public Review Board Report, 18 RUTGERS L. REv. 304, 341 (1964).
1. 1 COLo. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 22, Rule 265. The firm was incorpo-
rated under Colorado's general incorporation laws and consisted of four
lawyers. Each had an employment contract stipulating salary and agree-
ing to corporate direction as to clients and work loads. They also
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on undistributed corporate income. The district court held that
the corporation, duly authorized under Colorado law and posses-
sing the prerequisite corporate characteristics, was of such a
nature as to be classified as a corporation for federal income
tax purposes. Empey v. United States, 272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo.
1967).
Federal judicial determination of corporate tax status for
professional organizations is significant because of the tax advan-
tages which it confers upon both the organization and its
individual members.2 Such a determination depends upon the
relevant treasury regulations which are interpretations of the
1954 Code provisions defining "partaership and partner ' 3 and
"corporation. '4 These definitions are derived from earlier Code
provisions which date back to the Revenue Act of 1932. 5
Judicial decision has played a major role in defining the
scope of these treasury regulations. Analyzing a trust in terms of
its corporate characteristics, the Supreme Court in Morrissey
v. Commissioner6 stated that an organization is an association,
entered into a stock redemption agreement, which gave the corporation
an option to buy the stock, after which it could be sold to any qualified
practitioner. The corporation carried malpractice insurance for its
employees, as required, and otherwise carried out the responsibilities of
a corporate entity. Statement of Agreed Facts, Empey v. United States,
272 F. Supp. 851 (D. Colo. 1967).
2. See Anderson, Tax Aspects of Professional Corporations,
U. So. CAL. 1963 TAX LNsT. 309, 313-14.
Pension, profit-sharing, and annuity plans are granted to the em-
ployed but not to the self-employed. The usual course has been to
incorporate to obtain these advantages, but this avenue has been denied
to professionals because of various state laws which govern professional
practice. Alternative plans are available for the self-employed person
under the Keogh Plan, INT. REV. CoD- of 1954, §§ 72(n), 401(a),
401(c)-(g), 404(a) (8), 404(c), 404(f), 405, 503(j). See Eaton, Profes-
sional Associations as Planning Techniques, N.Y.U. 24TH INST. ON FED.
TAX. 671 (1966); Reichler, New Developments Under H.R. 10, N.Y.U.
24TH INST. ON FED. TAX. 687 (1966); Snyder & Weckstein, Quasi-Cor-
porations, Quasi-Employees and Quasi-Tax Relief for Professional
Persons, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 613 (1963).
3. INT. REV. CODE Of 1954, § 7701(a) (2).
4. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 7701(a) (3).
5. Scallen, Federal Income Taxation of Professional Associations
and Corporations, 49 Nimn. L. REV. 603, 624-29 (1965). There is a
lack of criteria within the statute by which to judge corporate classifi-
cation. Since congressional intent in early years was to let local
labels suffice, while current federal practice demands federal charac-
terization for federal tax purposes, any result is possible. Id. at 622.
See also J. MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION § 38.02 (1967).
6. 296 U.S. 344 (1935). The corporate characteristics relied on by
the court were: formation by associates with a business objective, cen-
tralization of title, centralized management, continuity of life through
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and therefore taxable as a corporation, if it merely resembles
a corporation; it need not be identical to one.7 Subsequently,
in Pelton v. Commissioner s the circuit court, using the corporate
resemblance test, conferred association status upon a medical
group, despite the existence of a state law which forbade the
practice of medicine by corporations. In both PeZton and Mor-
rissey the Commissioner argued for the classification of borderline
cases as associations. However, when numerous groups at-
tempted to achieve association status and the accompanying ben-
efits, the possibility of revenue loss caused the Commissioner to
reverse his position.9 The courts have not generally supported
this position.'0
United States v. Kintner," decided in 1954, presented the
case of a medical group classified under Montana law as a
partnership. The court of appeals, finding that the clinic was
more like a corporation than a partnership, 12 held the group to
be an association in spite of the fact that a corporation could
not legally practice medicine in that state. Rejecting the Com-
missioner's argument that state classification should be binding,
the court stated that this approach would introduce inconsistency
and uncertainty in the application of the regulations among
the states, 13 and would ignore the position of the regulations that
a self-perpetuating body, and free transfer of shares. 296 U.S. at 359.
As the Code definitions of corporation, association, and partnership
did not change from the 1932 Act to the 1954 Code, the Morrissey
decision is arguably good law. See INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 7701(a).
See also Swanson v. Commissioner, 296 U.S. 362 (1935); Helvering
v. Combo, 296 U.S. 365 (1935); Helvering v. Coleman-Gilbert, 296
U.S. 369 (1935). In all three cases, although the Court found defi-
ciencies in the creation and operation of the respective trusts, associa-
tion status was granted.
7. 296 U.S. at 357.
8. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
9. This latter position is now part of the regulations. Treas. Reg.
§ 301.7701-2(a) (3) (1960). See Scallen, supra note 5, at 673.
10. See, e.g., United States v. Kintner, 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir.
1954), affg 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont. 1952); Foreman v. United
States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964); Galt v. United States, 175 F.
Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
11. 216 F.2d 418 (9th Cir. 1954), affg 107 F. Supp. 976 (D. Mont.
1952).
12. Id. at 422. In Kintner management was provided by an
executive committee with fixed salaries for the members and provi-
sions for any surplus to be divided proportionately. By agreement,
the members limited liability to third parties only for their own per-
sonal misconduct. During the clinic's operation, it provided the doctors
with all goods and services necessary for their practice. Id. at 420-21.
13. Id. at 423. Similar fact situations prevailed against the Com-
missioner in Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959);
Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
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the Treasury would not be bound by state determinations.14
After hesitation, the Treasury responded with the Kintner
regulations,15 which redefined associations and placed emphasis
upon the determination by state law of the type of business form
involved. The determinative factor in these regulations was not
the nomenclature of the state law, but rather the restrictions
which state law commonly placed on such groups giving them
noncorporate characteristics. 6 In addition, these regulations
enumerated corporate characteristics to be met by associations
wishing to be taxed as corporations: 1) associates, 2) business
objective, 3) continuity of life, 4) centralized management, 5)
free transferability of interests, and 6) limited liability.17 To
be classified as an association, a group had to evidence more
corporate than noncorporate characteristics, excluding the re-
quirements of associates and business objective as determining
factors,'3 since these are characteristics met by all entities of a
business nature other than the sole proprietorship. Therefore,
under this regulatory scheme, an association had the burden of
showing it possessed three out of the four remaining character-
istics to be classified as an association. Because professionals
were unable to incorporate under the laws of most states,0 this
approach prevented most professionals and their groups from
attaining corporate tax status and the resulting individual bene-
fits.
However, the emphasis on the characteristics given to an or-
ganization by state law at the time of the business formation pro-
vided a means for professionals to obtain the desired tax benefits
through a change in state law permitting professional incorpora-
tion. Such action would change the facts of practice suffi-
14. Until the Kintner regulations were adopted, the Treasury's
position was that the Kintner case itself would not be accepted as
precedent by the Internal Revenue Service. Rev. Rul. 56-23, 1956-1
Cum. BuLL. 598.
15. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1 to -15, T.D. 6503, 1960-2 Cum. BULL.
409. Actually, these are "anti-Kintner" regulations which would pre-
vent future Kintner type results. Scallen, supra note 5, at 671-73.
16. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-1(c) (1960). See also Commissioner v.
Tower, 327 U.S. 280, 287-88 (1946), and Burk-Waggoner Ass'n v. Hop-
kins, 269 U.S. 110 (1925), as to the effect of local law classifications
under the Code.
17. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(a) (1)-(3) (1960). The effect of these
sections is to give all the required characteristics equal weight in the
determination of classification. Scallen, Supra note 5, at 715.
18. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(a) (3) (1960).
19. See Anderson, supra note 2.
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ciently20 to meet the federal requirement by removing traditional
disabilities and allowing the professional the same choice of busi-
ness form as allowed his counterpart in other fields. Resulting
enabling legislation which permitted lawyers to incorporate con-
sisted, in most states, of authorization of various forms of pro-
fessional associations or corporations.21  The solution in Colo-
rado was a revision in the rules of civil procedure by the su-
preme court.22
In response to such legislation, the Treasury in 1965 adopted
additional regulations for the classification of professional serv-
ice organizations.23 The new regulations provide for corporate
20. See Deering, Incorporation By Attorneys, 42 ORE. L. REV. 93
(1963).
21. See generally Bittker, Professional Associations and Federal
Income Taxation: Some Questions and Comments, 17 TAX L. REv. 1
(1961); Grayck, Professional Associations and The Kintner Regula-
tions: Some Answers, More Questions, and Further Comments, 17
TAX L. REV. 469 (1962).
22. 1 COLo. Rsv. STAT. ANN., ch. 22, Rule 265. The Supreme Court of
Colorado has authority to control and govern the practice of law in
Colorado. Bye & Young, Law Firm Incorporation in Colorado, 34
Rociy MT. L. REV. 427, 434 (1962).
It was provided that shareholders must be lawyers licensed by the
supreme court, owning the shares in their own right. Further, they
must be actively engaged in the practice of law in the offices of the
corporation. 1 CoLo. REv. STAT. ch. 22, Rule 265, at I. (D). Persons who
become ineligible to hold shares must dispose of the shares either to
the corporation or to someone with the proper qualifications. Id. at
I. (E).
The president must be a shareholder and a director. To the
extent possible, all other directors and officers must be lawyers licensed
by the Supreme Court of Colorado. In any event, lay officers and
directors may not exercise any authority over professional matters.
Id. at I. (F).
The articles of incorporation must provide that all shareholders are
jointly and severally liable or jointly and severally liable except when
lawyers' professional liability insurance is maintained. Fifty thousand
dollars insurance per attorney in the firm is required up to $900,000.
Id. at I. (G). Personal liability to the bar is retained as to conduct
and discipline. Id. at H. (C).
23. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-1(c), -2(h), T.D. 6797, 1965-1 CuM.
BULL. 553.
The reason given for the creation of this new classification and
category was that with the use of the corporate form by professionals,
the services rendered were not the type usually associated with cor-
porations or associations. See Brief of Defendant, at 18. But see
Foreman v. United States, 232 F. Supp. 134, 137 (S.D. Fla. 1964).
Concluding that a personal service income was of a type not normally
earned by a corporation, the court in Foreman labeled the govern-
ment's argument a fallacy in light of the large number of personal
service groups in the economy. The court commented that to its knowl-
edge the corporate tax status of advertising, sales, promotion, and sec-
retarial service groups, among others, had never been questioned.
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classification of professional service organizations, including
those called corporations under state law, only if they possess
enough corporate characteristics to be classified as such under
the Kintner regulations.24 Further provisions deal with the Mor-
rissey characteristics and their strict application to the profes-
sional service corporation or association.25 Though in no case
has a corporation classified as such by the states been held to
be otherwise by the courts, 26 the regulations still require an
examination of these groups. The instant case is the first case
testing the state enabling legislation and the federal regula-
tions as recently amended.
The government's position in the instant case was that while
local law controlled the determination of the legal relationships
in form, the federal standard provided by the regulations must
be met for determining federal taxation. 27 The government as-
serted that the association must therefore possess the required
corporate characteristics or it will be classified as a partnership.23
The Colorado firm's characteristics were then compared with
the regulation's requirements, including the recent elaborations
for the professional category,29 in an attempt to show no change
in the firm's operation as a partnership. 30 The regulations them-
selves were defended as possessing the force of law, written as
reasonable interpretations of the Code.31
The plaintiff attacked the regulations on the ground that
the Code definition of partnership precluded an attempt to in-
clude a de jure corporation in the partnership category of taxa-
tion.32 He cited Pelton v. Commissloner33 in opposition to the
government's theory that a professional service corporation is
essentially noncorporate to such a degree as to warrant a dif-
ferent tax result. The plaintiff also pointed out that the cor-
porate characteristics existed, that the firm operated as a valid
24. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(h) (1) (i) (1965).
25. In addition to the Kintner regulations, the professional service
associations must now meet further tests. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701(h)
(1)-(5) (1965).
26. See Bittker, supra note 21, at 26.
27. Brief of Defendant, at 11-14.
28. Id. The regulations state in § 301.7701-3 that "[tlhe term
'partnership' is broader in scope than the common law meaning of
partnership and may include groups not commonly called partnerships."
29. Brief of Defendant, at 17.
30. Id. at 55.
31. Id. at 56, citing Maryland Cas. Co. v. United States, 251 U.S.
342, 349 (1920).
32. Brief of Plaintiff, at 11.
33. 82 F.2d 473 (7th Cir. 1936).
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corporate entity, and that the restrictions placed on the cor-
poration by the Colorado Supreme Court in its rule of civil
procedure did not affect the corporate status and the resulting
legal rights and duties.3
4
After noting that the regulations demanded a search of char-
acteristics even for this formally chartered corporation, the
court determined that the regulations placing this organization
in the partnership class were inconsistent with the definition of
partnership in the Code.35 The court stated that the Code's
use of "other unincorporated organization" as coming within
the definition of partnership was enough to necessarily ex-
clude corporate bodies, thereby rendering the regulations in-
valid. The court also noted that there was no authority to
extend the partnership concept to such an encompassing de-
gree or to preclude corporate classification of professionals be-
cause of the nature of their services or their professional rela-
tion to clients.36
The court also found that the firm more nearly resembled a
corporation than a partnership, and thus, even if the regula-
tions were to apply, the firm would still be entitled to its re-
quested tax status. 37 Due in part to the decision to use the
Morrissey test of corporate resemblance, the court did not elabo-
rate on the possession of the required characteristics. Conclud-
ing that the corporation possessed these characteristics, and that
it was formally incorporated, the court held that the plaintiff
was entitled to a refund of income tax paid.
While viewing the problem from the standpoint of associa-
tion and corporate characteristics, the court mentioned state in-
corporation as an element in the determination of sufficient cor-
porate characteristics. Thus, state law has apparently influenced
the tax result for professionals-a result disapproved by the
prior cases as introducing uncertainty in taxation.38 However, if
prior decisions testing associations are valid, corporate tax sta-
34. Brief of Plaintiff, at 25.
35. 272 F. Supp. at 853.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 854.
38. See Galt v. United States, 175 F. Supp. 360 (N.D. Tex. 1959).
The court in Galt stated:
We think the association was entitled to be treated for tax
purposes as though it was a corporation and the act of a state
can neither raise nor lower the federal taxes that may be due
by the association by whatever name it may be called under the
laws of the particular state.
Id. at 362; see also Kintner v. United States, 216 F.2d 418, 424 (9th
Cir. 1954).
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tus is a federal question,3 9 and state incorporation is not deter-
minative. Yet by allowing states to remove local disabilities as
to choice of business forms for various types of businessmen
within their jurisdiction, certainty is arguably served when the
decision as to taxation on the federal level is one of classification
of groups which possess elements which clearly evidence a rea-
son for different tax treatment.
Because the problem of association has never been decided
by using a test based on the formal incorporation of the entity,40
the court in Empey freely relied upon the corporate resem-
blance test. By first declaring the Treasury's regulatory scheme
to be invalid, the court avoided detailed consideration of the re-
semblance test as outlined in Morrissey. However, the Morris-
sey tests have not been previously used to determine the tax
status of a de jure corporation. Thus, the existence of state in-
corporation provisions would seem to call for a more succinct
discussion of the characteristics which are present and their
relevance to the tax consequences. In addition, the fact that
the legislation in this area has been passed primarily to help
professionals avoid tax consequences 41 should arguably require
an examination into the substance of the organization.42  The
brevity of the opinion in Empey does not satisfy either these
questions or deal with the issue of the Commissioner's power to
go beyond the state incorporation statutes in defining corporate
tax status.
While the instant case is a step toward allowing a taxpayer
39. See Bittker, supra note 21, at 28-30.
40. See Anderson, supra note 2, at 317-22. In other tax areas the
corporateness of an entity is generally not questioned. The entity
itself, and its reasons for existence are usually accepted after being
chartered under state law, thus causing the entity to come into being
for tax purposes. See Moline Properties, Inc. v. Commissioner, 319
U.S. 436, 438-39 (1943). However, the corporation must intend to
carry on business and actually do so. See Tomlinson v. Miles, 316 F.2d
710, 713-14 (5th Cir. 1963).
The entity itself can be ignored when it is a fiction or a sham, as
when it is operating as a true agent or as a fraud on the tax statutes.
However, it is then destroyed altogether for failure to carry out a true
business purpose, rather than for failure to meet a federal requirement
regarding incorporation standards. See National Carbide Corp. v.
Commissioner, 336 U.S. 422 (1949); Continental Oil Co. v. Jones, 113
F.2d 557 (10th Cir. 1940).
41. See Note, Professional Corporations and Associations, 75 HAV.
L. REv. 776, 789-90 (1962).
42. A legal transaction will not be denied effect because of a tax
motive, but it may be examined to see if it is in reality what it ap-
pears to be; substance, not form, is controlling. Morsman v. Com-
missioner, 90 F.2d 18, 22 (8th Cir. 1937).
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